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ABSTRACT
A description is given of problems encountered from distortion and failure of major
reactor core components in the high neutron fluence regions of the Plum Brook Reactor.
Reactor material surveillance programs, the failure mode of the components, compo-
nent replacement methods, associated health hazards, and the distortion of components
against neutron fluence are described.
EXPERIENCES WITH BERYLLIUM SWELLING AND REPLACEMENT
IN THE PLUM BROOK REACTOR*
by William Fecych
Lewis Research Center
SUMMARY
The swelling and fracture of beryllium reactor core components pose a challenging
problem for the operators of high flux reactors which use beryllium as a reflector ma-
terial. Neutron embrittiement and gas formation in beryllium result in distortion which
may cause interference between movable components, such as the failure of the control
rods to fall properly after a scram signal, or the fracture of highly radioactive major
core components. Both of these problems are costly in reactor operating time and can
be difficult to correct.
At the Plum Brook Reactor control rod drop time tests performed at every reactor
startup, periodic measurements on the fixed and movable core beryllium components,
and visual inspections were used to detect and monitor a potential safety problem.
Beryllium component distortion rates against fast neutron fluence and the nuclear and
physical environment are described. A description is given of the electrical discharge
machining method used to remove the core box side plates. The techniques used to limit
and control the health hazards are described. The mode of failure of the beryllium side
plate is given.
INTRODUCTION
The Plum Brook Reactor (PER) is a 60-megawatt (thermal) light water moderated
and beryllium reflected high flux test reactor. The fast neutron (E > 0.1 MeV) reaction
with the reactor core beryllium causes embrittiement and helium gas formation. This
results in distortion and fracture of the core components. Distortion causes the pre-
*Presented at American Nuclear Society Meeting, Washington, D. C., November
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cisely machined and spaced control rods to fall in drop times outside the allowable limits.
Embrittlement and swelling cause fracture of a core box beryllium side plate. A sur-
veillance program was established to monitor and measure the effects of the distortion
and swelling. Electrical discharge machining (EDM) was used to remove the fractured
beryllium plate. A beryllium management program was established to rotate and replace
the sensitive components to avoid interference problems and to extend the life of the com-
ponents.
DESCRIPTION
The Plum Brook Reactor is operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration under AEC License TR-3. The reactor first achieved full power in March 1963
and has operated for a total of 37 256 megawatt days to February 1968.
The PER reactor core is mounted in a 9-foot-diameter by 30-foot-high tank (fig. 1).
The reactor core has a 9 x 3 array of aluminum clad plate fuel elements, and each fuel
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element contains 240 grams of U in an uranium-aluminum alloy. Removable beryl-
lium reflector pieces 31 i inches long by 3 inches square surround the fueled core on the
north, east, and west sides (fig. 2). Five control rods with beryllium followers are in
alternate positions with the north removable reflector pieces. Four rows of eight 4-inch-
square beryllium pieces abut the south side of the fueled core and are separated from the3
core by a 1-inch-thick, 35-r-inch by 41-inch beryllium plate. A similar plate bounds the
north side. These plates serve as hydraulic barriers for the primary cooling water flow.
Each plate was fastened to the lower grid with five inaccessible bolts from below. The
plates are also fastened to the east and west side plates with bolts which are accessible.
SURVEILLANCE OF REACTOR MATERIALS
The effect of neutron embrittlement and gas formation on beryllium has been de-
scribed in various publications (ref. 1). Since its initial operation PER has had test spec-
imens of various reactor materials under irradiation in specific test locations. The test
locations do not provide a neutron fluence equal to the maximum fluence on the south
beryllium plate. Consequently other surveillance methods were used to monitor the dis-
tortion of the beryllium control rods, the beryllium reflector pieces, and the beryllium
and aluminum core box plates. These consisted of frequent control rod drop time mea-
surements; physical measurements on the removable beryllium pieces in the Hot Labora-
tory; underwater remote reading electronic micrometers to measure the spacing, square-
ness, and the profile of the north and south beryllium plates and the east and west alumi-
num plates; and visual inspections with optical aids.
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REFLECTOR CONTROL RODS
From the surveillance program it was discovered that the bowing of the beryllium
reflector control section caused the rods to bend. The control rod is made up of three
sections: a stainless-steel poison section, a beryllium reflector section, and a lower
stainless-steel guide sections. The three sections are tied together with one locking bolt.
The lower section has two sets of bearings - a fixed lower bearing to center the drop of
the control rod into a dashpot and an upper bearing with lateral float. The stainless-steel
poison section is guided by a bearing block located on the core box upper grid.
During control rod drop tests in February 1967, the control rod, located in core po-
sition LA-8, would stop under no-flow conditions about 1 foot from its seated dashpot po-
sition. The rod would fall properly when the locking bolt located on the top of the poison
section was loosened. This allowed the control rod sections to hinge.
A special alinement jig was made to measure the assembled control rods (fig. 3).
Figure 4 shows the alinement jig in the Hot Laboratory with a bowed beryllium section in-
stalled. The bowed assembled rod is shown to be 3/8 inch away from the zero reference
screw. Each beryllium reflector control rod section has an aluminum box at each end
Figure 3. - Alinement jig with
assembled control rod.
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Figure 4. - Control rod in alinement jig with bowed beryllium
section.
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Figure 5. - Control rod (LA-8) with a bowed section installed and results with corrective
machining.
which has the necessary mechanical devices for attachment. The beryllium section alum-
inum end boxes were mechanically machined parallel to provide proper alinement of the
assembled control rods. Figure 5 graphically shows the results of this corrective ma-
chining.
BERYLLIUM PLATE
From the surveillance measurements on the south beryllium plate it was determined
that the bowing rate towards the fuel elements was three times greater than expected.
The plate, as it continued to bow, came into contact with the aluminum side plate of the
fuel elements. Analysis and measurements indicated that the fuel elements could support
the load. A visual inspection in February 1968 (37 256 MWD) indicated that the south
beryllium plate had cracked during the cycle (fig. 6). A safety analysis had previously
shown that reactor operations with a cracked plate would be safe and acceptable, and no
abnormalities were observed during the cycle.
To mechanically remove the inaccessible bolts which anchor the side plates to the
lower grid, the entire core box would have to be removed from the supporting structure.
This also would require the removal of all the precisely alined beam tubes and through
tubes. To avoid this major disassembly, the feasibility of using EDM was investigated.
It had the following advantages:
P68-0126
Figure 6. - Top half of broken beryllium south plate.
(1) The bolts could be easily severed.
(2) The process was adaptable to remote underwater application.
(3) Electrodes could be used which would not contaminate the primary system. Nickel
was selected as the electrode material over copper, tungsten, and graphite. Nickel was
compatible from a corrosion standpoint with the aluminum clad fuel elements and did not
form any troublesome activation products if plated out on the core components.
(4) The EDM could be used to remove the beryllium plate from the grooves if mechan-
ical methods failed.
To replace the plates, the reactor tank dome was removed, all possible core compo-
nents were removed, the water level lowered, and a work platform installed 6 feet above
the reactor core. The reactor tank wall was covered with a heavy plastic sheet to reduce
contamination and radiation. A circulating water pump was installed to provide cooling
for the EDM electrode and collect the particles and chips from the EDM operation. A
blower was used to remove the gases which were generated during the EDM operation.
The blower discharge was through a high efficiency air filter to the stack. The blower
also provided the fresh air for normal reactor tank working environment.
After the lower bolts were severed using EDM with nickel electrodes, the north plate
and the top half of the broken south plate were lifted out. The lower half of the south plate
could not be removed mechanically because it had swelled and was wedged into its retain-
ing slots in the aluminum side plates and the lower grid. Various mechanical pulling de-
vices were tried. Attempts to drill holes in the plate for attachment of pulling devices
were unsuccessful. The mechanical properties of the plate varied. It crumbled in the
8
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REFLfCTOR CONTROL RODS
From the surveillance program it was discovered that the bowing of the beryllium
reflector control section caused the rods to bend. The control rod is made up of three
sections: a stainless-steel poison section, a beryllium reflector section, and a lower
stainless-steel guide sections. The three sections are tied together with one locking bolt.
The lower section has two sets of bearings - a fixed lower bearing to cente'r the drop of
the control rod into a dashpot and an upper bearing with lateral float. The stainless-steel
poison section is guided by a bearing block located on the core box upper grid.
During control rod drop tests in February 1967, the control rod, located in core po-
sition LA-8, would stop under no-flow conditions about 1 foot from its seated dashpot po-
sition. The rod would fall properly when the locking bolt located on the top of the poison
section was loosened. This allowed the control rod sections to hinge.
A special alinement jig was made to measure the assembled control rods (fig. 3).
Figure 4 shows the alinement jig in the Hot Laboratory with a bowed beryllium section in-
stalled. The bowed assembled rod is shown to be 3/8 inch away from the zero reference
screw. Each beryllium reflector control rod section has an aluminum box at each end
Figure 3. - Alinement jig with
assembled control rod.
Figure 4. -Control rod in alinement jig with towed beryllium
section.
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which has the necessary mechanical devices for attachment. The beryllium section alum-
inum end boxes were mechanically machined parallel to provide proper alinement of the
assembled control rods. Figure 5 graphically shows the results of this corrective ma-
chining.
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From the surveillance measurements on the south beryllium plate it was determined
that the bowing rate towards the fuel elements was three times greater than expected.
The plate, as it continued to bow, came into contact with the aluminum side plate of the
fuel elements. Analysis and measurements indicated that the fuel elements could support
the load. A visual inspection in February 1968 (37 256 MWD) indicated that the south
beryllium plate had cracked during the cycle (fig. 6). A safety analysis had previously
shown that reactor operations with a cracked plate would be safe and acceptable, and no
abnormalities were observed during the cycle.
To mechanically remove the inaccessible bolts which anchor the side plates to the
lower grid, the entire core box would have to be removed from the supporting structure.
This also would require the removal of all the precisely alined beam tubes and through
tubes. To avoid this major disassembly, the feasibility of using EDM was investigated.
It had the following advantages:
Figure 6. - Top half of broken beryllium south plate.
(1) The bolts could be easily severed.
(2) The process was adaptable to remote underwater application.
(3) Electrodes could be used which would not contaminate the primary system. Nickel
was selected as the electrode material over copper, tungsten, and graphite. Nickel was
compatible from a corrosion standpoint with the aluminum clad fuel elements and did not
form any troublesome activation products if plated out on the core components.
(4) The EDM could be used to remove the beryllium plate from the grooves if mechan-
ical methods failed.
To replace the plates, the reactor tank dome was removed, all possible core compo-
nents were removed, the water level lowered, and a work platform installed 6 feet above
the reactor core. The reactor tank wall was covered with a heavy plastic sheet to reduce
contamination and radiation. A circulating water pump was installed to provide cooling
for the EDM electrode and collect the particles and chips from the EDM operation. A
blower was used to remove the gases which were generated during the EDM operation.
The blower discharge was through a high efficiency air filter to the stack. The blower
also provided the fresh air for normal reactor tank working environment.
After the lower bolts were severed using EDM with nickel electrodes, the north plate
and the top half of the broken south plate were lifted out. The lower half of the south plate
could not be removed mechanically because it had swelled and was wedged into its retain-
ing slots in the aluminum side plates and the lower grid. Various mechanical pulling de-
vices were tried. Attempts to drill holes in the plate for attachment of pulling devices
were unsuccessful. The mechanical properties of the plate varied. It crumbled in the
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high fluence areas and was extremely hard at the sides and bottom so that elaborate drill-
ing fixtures would have to be made to perform this remote underwater operation. Conse-
quently the EDM was used to remove the plate.
From shutdown to critical the beryllium replacement required 94 days. Two persons
working in the reactor tank reached one-half of the allowable (1. 25 rem) quarterly health-
safety radiation exposure.
The design of the north and south plate was changed to
(1) Make the plates interchangeable
(2) Make each plate so it could be rotated to bow in the opposite direction
(3) Reduce the thickness by 0. 005 inch where the plate is held in the lower grid and
end plate slots
(4) Cut back the sides and the bottom of the plate 0. 025 inch to allow for length and
width growth
Upon completion of the beryllium installation and the reactor tank work, the dummy
fuel elements were installed in the core and the primary system operated for cleanup. It
was discovered that after the many precautions taken to collect all the chips and avoid the
loss of items in the reactor tank, significant amounts of debris were collected. The pri-
mary system strainer has openings of about 0. 060 inch. Slivers with 0.060 inch diameter
and longer length could pass through the strainer and scratch the aluminum cladding if
caught between a fueled control rod and the adjacent stationary fuel element in C-row, or
between fuel elements.
The tests to determine the effects of the new beryllium were the shutdown margin
evaluation and control rod worth calibration. There were no measurable changes of the
nuclear parameters.
BERYLLIUM MACHINING HEALTH HAZARDS
To determine the health hazards of using EDM on beryllium, an unirradiated piece
was machined under controlled conditions and air samples obtained. The test was con-
ducted in a portable fume hood with the beryllium test piece under 1 foot of water. Anal-
ysis of the air sample showed the concentration to be 50 micrograms per cubic meter.
Therefore the following health safety controls were established for machining the irra-
diated reactor core beryllium in the reactor tank under 6 feet of water:
(1) Airline respirators were worn at all times in the reactor tank during EDM opera-
tion. Full face respirators were required in the reactor tank at all other times.
(2) A plastic enclosure was installed over the reactor tank with positive airflow to
the radioactive waste air header.
(3) All personnel working in the reactor, tank were required to wear anticontamination
clothing and take showers at the completion of the day's work.
(4) In-tank air samples were taken during the operation.
All air samples collected indicated that the work was performed well below the per-
missible level (ref. 2) of 2 micrograms per cubic meter. The reactor tank airborne con-
centration during the EDM operation was 0. 04 microgram per cubic meter. Smears taken
on the reactor tank wall showed a buildup of beryllium contamination to levels of 500 mir
crograms per square meter. Special care was taken to avoid contact with the contamina-
ted surfaces, and the surfaces were kept wetted.
Upon completion of the EDM work the reactor tank wall was decontaminated by wiping
to less than 1. 0 microgram per square meter. During initial cleanup of the primary
system, a primary water sample indicated that the beryllium concentration was 6. 6 mi-
crograms per milliliter. This level has been considerably reduced with continued clean-
up of the primary system during reactor operations.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Neutron Fluences
Beryllium has the desirable nuclear properties for use in a reactor, but lacks duc-
tility, which limits is use in structures. The beryllium test specimens surveillance in-
indicated a loss in the ductility with increasing neutron fluence. The failure of the south
beryllium plate is typical of a brittle fracture. The maximum neutron fluence (E > 0.1
22MeV) on the plate is 3x10 neutrons per square centimeter, and the fluence at the side
21edges is 2. 2x10 neutrons per square centimeter. The fluences on the north plate are a
factor of four lower.
Beryllium Material
The plates were made from a beryllium block of high purity hot pressed material.
The trace impurities of high neutron cross section material were kept low. A gamma
scan performed on the beryllium 73 days after the last irradiation revealed the major iso-
topes to be cobalt 50 = 1.1 millicuries per gram and scandium 46 = 1.5 millicuries per
gram. The radiation level during removal of the plate was estimated to be 5000 roentgens
per hour on contact.
During irradiation it is estimated that the temperature of the beryllium is from 50° to
75° C. Since the original installation the south plate grew about 0. 050 inch in width (from
actual measurements at the center of the plate), and it is estimated that the plate grew
about 0. 002 inch in thickness in the slot areas.
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Bowing Rates
The bowing rate for each removable beryllium "L" Section piece was determined
from actual measurements. The fast flux ratio (E > 0.1 MeV) is the average value for
the position over the normal operating cycle of 14 days. The bowing rates are tabulated
below.
Location
LD-1
LC-1
LB-1
LA-1
LA-3
LA- 5
LA-7
LA-9
LA-11
LB-11
LC-11
LD-11
Fast flux
ratioa
0.60
.68
.60
.28
.86
1.0
1.0
.86
.28
.60
.68
.60
Position
bowing rate,
in. /1 000 MWD
0. 0007
.0008
. 0007
.0003
.0010
.0012
.0012
.0010
. 0003
.0007
.0008
.0007
al = 1. 8xl014 neutrons/(cm2)(sec).
For the control rod reflector section, the bowing rate and the out-of-squareness
must be considered for the entire assembly.
The misalinement rate of the control rod reflector section is given below with an out-
of-squareness factor of four applied to the position bowing rate:
Location
LA-2
LA-4
LA-6
LA-8
LA-10
Fast flux
ratioa
0.67
.97
1.0
.97
.67
Position
bowing rate,
in. /1000 MWD
0. 0008
.0011
.0012
.0011
.0008
Misalinement
rate,
in. /1 000 MWD
0. 0032
.0044
.0048
.0044
.0032
al = 1.8X1014 neutrons/(cm2)(sec).
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Positions LA-2 and LA-10 have regulating rods and one rod is operated partially in-
serted. A correction must be made to the misalinement rate based on the operating his-
tory.
The bowing rate for the south beryllium plate was measured to be 0. 003 inch per
1000 MWD, and for the north plate 0. 0008 inch per 1000 MWD.
CONCLUSIONS
In construction of reactor components in high fluence locations, the reactor designer
must allow for changes in physical dimensions and mechanical properties of the material.
All sensitive components should be readily replaceable and safety analysis made of the
consequence of a failure of these components during reactor operation. Work with highly
radioactive and toxic materials can be safely done with proper evaluations, tests, and
planning. Surveillance programs must be related carefully to all the environmental pa-
rameters (fluence, temperature, physical, mechanical, etc.) and operating conditions of
the materials.
Lewis Research Center,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Cleveland, Ohio, February 6, 1969,
122-29-05-01-22.
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